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loud computing delivers a flexible network comput-
ing model that allows organizations to adjust their IT 
capabilities on the fly with minimal investment in IT 
infrastructure and maintenance. Because an organi-
zation need only pay for the services it uses, it can 
focus on its core business instead of handling techni-
cal issues.
In the cloud computing context, network-accessible resources are 
defined as services. These services are typically delivered via one of 
three cloud computing service models: 
•	 Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) offers storage, computation, and 
network capabilities to service subscribers through virtual ma-
chines (VMs). 
•	 Platform as a service (PaaS) provides an environment for software 
application development and hosts a client’s applications in a PaaS 
provider’s computing infrastructure. 
•	 Software as a service (SaaS) delivers on-demand software services 
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These technical and business advantages, howev-
er, don’t come without cost. The security vulnerabili-
ties inherited from the underlying technologies (that 
is, virtualization, IP, APIs, and datacenter) prevent 
organizations from adopting the cloud in many criti-
cal business applications.1 Generally speaking, cloud 
computing is a service-oriented architecture (SOA). 
Earlier work gives a comprehensive dependability and 
security taxonomy framework revealing the complex 
security cause-implication relations in this architec-
ture.2 We summarize cloud computing vulnerabilities 
by underlying technology in the sidebar. 
These vulnerabilities leave loopholes, allowing 
cyberintruders to exploit cloud computing servic-
es and threatening the security and privacy of big 
data. Various security schemes, such as encryption, 
authentication, access control, firewalls, intrusion 
detection system  (IDSs), and data leak prevention 
systems (DLPSs), address these security issues. In 
this complex computing environment, however, no 
single scheme fits all cases. These schemes should 
thus be integrated and cooperate to provide a com-
prehensive line of defense. 
Intrusion Detection for Securing Cloud 
Computing
IDSs aim to provide a layer of defense against mali-
cious uses of computing systems by sensing attacks 
and alerting users. Because it’s impossible to prevent 
all cyberattacks, IDSs have become essential to se-
curing cloud computing environments. 
IDSs are commonly categorized by the type of 
data source involved in detection. Host-based IDSs 
(HIDSs) detect malicious events on host machines. 
They handle insider attacks (which attempt to gain 
unauthorized privileges) and user-to-root attacks 
(which attempt to gain root privileges to VMs or the 
host). Network-based IDSs (NIDSs) monitor and 
flag traffic carrying malicious contents or present-
ing malicious patterns. This type of IDS can detect 
direct and indirect flooding attacks, port-scanning 
attacks, and so on.
Although to some extent, DLPSs can be consid-
ered a type of IDS, they’re more tailored to data se-
curity. However, it’s difficult to completely guarantee 
data security using DLPSs alone. Attackers who gain 
control of the host machines can modify the DLPS 
settings, thereby completely disclosing data to those 
attackers. Moreover, even though firewalls can block 
unwanted network traffic packets according to a pre-
defined rule set, they can’t detect sophisticated in-
trusive attempts such as flooding and insider attacks. 
IDSs, DLPSs, and firewalls are therefore not inter-
changeable security schemes but collaborative ones.
Conventional IDSs
Conventional IDSs are mostly standalone systems re-
siding on computer networks or host machines. They 
can be categorized as misuse-based or anomaly-
based IDSs, depending on the detection mechanism 
applied.
Misuse-based IDSs enjoy high detection accu-
racy but are vulnerable to all zero-day intrusions.3 
This is due to the underlying detection mechanism 
that checks for a match with existing attack signa-
tures. Obviously, an IDS can’t generate signatures 
for an unknown attack. Anomaly-based IDSs show 
promise for detecting zero-day intrusions,4,5 but are 
prone to high false positives. 
Current enterprise networks (such as cloud 
computing environments) typically have multiple 
entry points. This topology is intended to enhance a 
network’s accessibility and availability, but it leaves 
security vulnerabilities that sophisticated attackers 
can exploit using advanced techniques, such as co-
operative intrusions. 
Unlike traditional attack mechanisms, coop-
erative attack mechanisms are launched simultane-
ously by slave machines within a botnet. Attackers 
organize instances of this attack type to penetrate 
an enterprise network through all its entry points. 
By evenly distributing the attack traffic volume to 
the different entry points, these cooperative intru-
sions can evade detection of traditional standalone 
IDSs set in front of the entry points. This is be-
cause network traffic behavior at each entry point 
doesn’t significantly deviate from normal behavior. 
After traveling through the entry points, the attack 
instances are directed to a single targeted service 
within the enterprise network.
Moreover, many of the existing intrusions can 
occur collaboratively and simultaneously on nodes 
throughout a network. Attackers can initiate auto-
mated attacks targeting all vulnerable services with-
in a network simultaneously,6 rather than focusing 
on a specific service. 
















Need for Collaborative Intrusion Detection
Conventional standalone IDSs are susceptible to 
cooperative attacks, so are unsuitable for collabora-
tive environments (such as a cloud computing en-
vironment). To defend against this type of attack, 
collaborative intrusion detection systems (CIDSs) 
correlate suspicious evidence between different 
IDSs to improve the intrusion detection efficien-
cy. Unlike conventional standalone IDSs, a CIDS 
shares traffic information with the IDSs located at a 
local network’s entry points. 
In practice, we can organize IDSs within a 
CIDS in a decentralized7 or hierarchical8 manner 
over a large network. These IDSs communicate di-
rectly with each other or with a central coordinator, 
according to the applied mode of organization.
In a decentralized CIDS, each IDS can gener-
ate a complete attack diagram of the network by ag-
Vulnerabilities in underlying 
technologies 
ulnerabilities in the cloud’s underly-
ing technologies allow cyberintruders 
to exploit cloud computing services and 
threaten the security and privacy of big data.
Virtualization
Virtualization facilitates multitenancy and re-
source sharing (such as physical machines and 
networks) and enables maximum utilization 
of available resources. Categories include full, 
OS-layer, and hardware-layer virtualizations.
Virtual machines (VMs) can gain full access 
to a host’s resources if isolation between the 
host and the VMs isn’t properly configured and 
maintained. (In this case, the VMs escape to 
the host and seize root privileges.) In addition, 
a VM’s security can’t be guaranteed if its host 
is compromised. Hosts and their VMs share 
networks via a virtual switch, which VMs could 
use as a channel to capture the packets transit-
ing over the networks or to launch Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning attacks. 
Finally, because a host shares computing 
resources with its VMs, a guest could launch 
a denial-of-service (DoS) attack via a VM by 
taking up all the host’s resources. 
iP suite
The IP suite, the core component of the 
Internet, ensures the functioning of inter-
networking systems and allows access to 
remote computing resources.
Defects in the implementation of the 
TCP/IP protocol suite can lead to a variety of 
attacks, including IP spoofing, ARP spoofing, 
DNS poisoning, Routing Information Proto-
col (RIP) attacks, flooding, HTTP session rid-
ing, and session hijacking.
application Programming interfaces
APIs provide interfaces for managing cloud 
services, including service provisioning, 
orchestration, and monitoring. Areas of 
vulnerability include weak credentials, 
authorization checks, and input-data valida-
tion, which could allow an attacker to seize 
root privileges. Developers might introduce 
defects during the design and implementa-
tion of cloud APIs or introduce new security 
vulnerabilities when fixing bugs.
datacenter
Datacenter technologies allow administra-
tors to manage and store data. Data is often 
stored, processed, and transferred in plain-
text, which can be compromised, lead-
ing to the loss of confidentiality. Attackers 
might also find residual data from data 
that’s been deleted. Finally, in a datacenter, 
data from different users (both legitimate 
users and intruders) is mixed together with 
weak separation, providing opportunities 
for an intruder to access the data of the 
legitimate users.
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gregating network information received from other 
IDSs in the CIDS. Detection of malicious attempts 
is undertaken locally at each IDS. In a hierarchical 
CIDS, a coordinator is a central point responsible 
for information aggregation. The central coordina-
tor, which analyzes the aggregated information, gen-
erates a complete attack diagram of the network.
Limitations of Current Collaborative IDSs
Collaborative IDSs seem promising for detecting co-
operative intrusions. However, existing system archi-
tectures aren’t without criticism. In CIDSs, network 
data summarization is an important precursor to reli-
able intrusion detection.9 However, traditionally, net-
work information is collected and processed by IDS 
software built on a single network device that only 
deals with the traffic flowing in and out of that de-
vice. It therefore has limited traffic information. In 
addition, the computation of network data summa-
rization is proportional to the amount of traffic flow 
that single device experiences. Such an approach has 
drawbacks in terms of both accuracy and efficiency. 
In terms of accuracy, without knowledge of the 
network data from other nodes, any summarization 
is specific to a partial and insignificant portion of all 
available data over the entire network. Exchanging 
and combining these summarizations later, without 
the actual data, provides a minimal information gain.
In terms of efficiency, nodes with denser traffic 
require additional computation to process summa-
rization. Because summarization is a pure overhead 
operation, in an ideal environment, a node will have 
less traffic to process when performing summariza-
tion tasks. 
Security is another concern for existing CI-
DSs. If a CIDS is compromised, the entire cloud 
computing environment is in danger. Conventional 
IDS software, installed on a single network device, 
analyzes and maintains network information on the 
device but doesn’t include security properties that 
ensure confidentiality, authentication, and integrity. 
Thus, CIDSs that are designed simply by integrating 
conventional IDS software without proper security 
enhancements are vulnerable to attacks.
Collaborative Intrusion Detection 
Framework
Given the defects of existing CIDSs, a new sophis-
ticated CIDS framework could strengthen the se-
curity of cloud computing systems. However, cloud 
computing presents unique issues. With a large, 
dense network of nodes forming a cloud environ-
ment, cloud computing offers us unprecedented 
opportunities for making available network data 
from all nodes. At the same time, it requires that we 
perform summarization and combine the results in 
a distributed and parallel manner. In addition, be-
cause we’re now dealing with all the network data 
in the entire cloud, where an unknown number of 
categories can exist, the summarization algorithms 
will need to expand their categories on demand to 
automatically create new clusters when they discov-
er new types of traffic emerging.
Given the characteristics of cloud computing, 
we must consider several desirable properties when 
designing a new CIDS framework. These properties 
include fast detection of various attacks with minimal 
false positive rates, scalability with the expansion of 
the cloud computing system, self-adaption to changes 
in the cloud computing environment, and resistance 
to compromise.10 Figure 1 shows the framework of 
our proposed CIDS, which meets these requirements.
As Figure 1 shows, HIDSs and NIDSs cooper-
ate to perform intrusion detection at the host and 
network levels, and each IDS in the network is 
equipped with signature- and anomaly-based detec-
tors.11 This tactic ensures better detection accuracy 
in both known and unknown attacks. 
There are two categories of nodes in this frame-
work—cooperative agent and central coordinator. 
These nodes form a collaborative system whose se-
curity is assured through the implementation of var-
ious security mechanisms. 
Cooperative Agents
Cooperative agents stand at the front lines and de-
tect misuses on host machines or malicious behavior 
on networks. These agents are equipped with HIDSs 
or NIDSs depending on their location—agents in-
stalled on a host machine to detect suspicious events 
are equipped with HIDSs, whereas agents monitor-
ing traffic on a network are equipped with NIDSs. 
In our framework, the cooperative agents located 
on host machines are a new type of HIDS, requiring 
no instrumentation within VMs or models processes 
at the VM granularity level (that is, treating VMs as 
individual processes and modeling VM behaviors 
accordingly). This scheme ensures that our detec-
tion system complies with service-level agreements 
(SLAs) and legal restrictions, which might not al-
low an IaaS provider to make amendments or per-
form intensive monitoring and surveillance on client 
VMs. It also alleviates the ineffectiveness of NIDSs 
on encrypted traffic. The host-based cooperative 
agents inform a central coordinator when they de-
tect an intrusive behavior or activity.
Cooperative agents residing at the network 
level conduct first-tier detection, defending against 
















generic attacks that present abnormality within the 
network traffic and don’t involve sophisticated co-
operation. The network-based cooperative agents 
alert a central coordinator to any suspicious pack-
ets detected. Meanwhile, these agents summarize 
network traffic flowing through the network in a 
distributed and parallel manner. In network data 
summarization, the nonparametric Bayes could be 
a suitable machine learning approach for solving 
the challenges of cloud computing.12 Network sum-
marization is particularly important for detecting 
cooperative intrusions, such as distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks. These summarizations 
are periodically sent to a central coordinator, as we 
discuss next. 
This parallel summarization is empowered by 
cloud computing through the MapReduce frame-
work.13 The MapReduce framework provides seam-
less and effortless integration of our CIDS framework 
into a distributed and parallel architecture by treating 
the network-based cooperative agents as slave nodes 
and the central coordinator as a master node. The 
MapReduce framework manages all details, ranging 
from scheduling to information aggregation.
Central Coordinator
Finally, the network traffic aggregation is performed 
on the central coordinator, which generates a com-
plete attack diagram of the entire network (that is, 
the cloud computing system). Based on this aggre-
gation, the central coordinator is capable of captur-
ing sophisticated cooperative intrusions that the 
individual network-based cooperative agents miss. 
When intrusive behaviors (including those identified 
by the cooperative agents and the central coordina-
tor) are detected, the central coordinator raises an 
alert to a system administrator. 
It’s worth noting that a hybrid detector combin-
ing misuse- and anomaly-based detection mecha-
nisms can help reduce the time needed to detect 


















FIgURE 1. Framework of a collaborative intrusion detection system (CIDS). The figure illustrates how the different 
types of fellow IDSs are deployed in a cloud computing environment, and how they cooperate with each other and 
central coordinators in detecting intrusions. (HIDS: host-based IDS, NIDS: network-based IDS)
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Security Mechanisms 
To ensure that the CIDS is resistant to compromise, 
we use authentication and encryption as well as 
an integrity check. Because the CIDS works 24/7, 
energy-efficient group key distribution schemes are 
preferable for secure key distribution and node au-
thentication.14,15 These schemes provide a strong, 
secure mechanism for updating group keys when 
nodes join in or leave the network or a node is be-
ing compromised. They’re also resilient to collusion 
attacks, in which multiple nodes are compromised 
and coordinated for attack. Finally, a backup central 
coordinator runs alongside the main coordinator to 
prevent a single point of failure. The coordinators’ 
roles can be exchanged depending on actual require-
ments and network conditions.
uture studies will explore the framework’s im-
plementation and application on different cloud 
computing systems. Focuses of our future studies 
will be casted on algorithms for distributed and par-
allel data summarization on cloud computing, and 
their implementation on the MapReduce framework, 
as well as new detection approaches for HIDSs.
Acknowledgments
The work described here was performed when Zhi-
yuan Tan was a research associate with the School 
of Computing and Communications at the Univer-
sity of Technology, Sydney.
References
1. C. Modi et al., “A Survey on Security Issues and 
Solutions at Different Layers of Cloud Comput-
ing,” J. Supercomputing, vol. 63, no. 2, 2013, pp. 
561–592.
2. J. Hu et al., “Seamless Integration of Depend-
ability and Security Concepts in SOA: A Feed-
back Control System Based Framework and Tax-
onomy,” J. Network and Computer Applications, 
vol. 34, no. 4, 2011, pp. 1150–1159.
3. Y. Meng, W. Li, and L.-F. Kwok, “Towards Adap-
tive Character Frequency-Based Exclusive Sig-
nature Matching Scheme and Its Applications 
in Distributed Intrusion Detection,” Computer 
Networks, vol. 57, no. 17, 2013, pp. 3630–3640.
4. G. Creech and J. Hu, “A Semantic Approach to 
Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems Using 
Contiguous and Discontiguous System Call Pat-
terns,” IEEE Trans. Computers, vol. 63, no. 4, 
2014, pp. 807–819.
5. Z. Tan et al., “A System for Denial-of-Service At-
tack Detection Based on Multivariate Correla-
tion Analysis,” IEEE Trans. Parallel and Distrib-
uted Systems, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, pp. 447–456.
6. S. Savage, “Internet Outbreaks: Epidemiol-
ogy and Defenses,” keynote address, Internet 
Soc. Symp. Network and Distributed System 
Security (NDSS 05), 2005; http://cseweb.ucsd.
edu/~savage/papers/InternetOutbreak.NDSS05 
.pdf.
7. S. Ram, “Secure Cloud Computing Based on 
Mutual Intrusion Detection System,” Int’l J. 
Computer Application, vol. 2, no. 1, 2012, pp. 
57–67.
8. S.N. Dhage and B. Meshram, “Intrusion Detec-
tion System in Cloud Computing Environment,” 
Int’l J. Cloud Computing, vol. 1, no. 2, 2012, pp. 
261–282.
9. D. Hoplaros, Z. Tari, and I. Khalil, “Data Sum-
marization for Network Traffic Monitoring,” J. 
Network and Computer Applications, vol. 37, Jan. 
2014, pp. 194–205. 
10. A. Patel et al., “An Intrusion Detection and Pre-
vention System in Cloud Computing: A System-
atic Review,” J. Network and Computer Applica-
tions, vol. 36, no. 1, 2013, pp. 25–41.
11.  A.K. Jones and R.S. Sielken, Computer System 
Intrusion Detection: A Survey, tech. report, Dept. 
of Computer Science, Univ. of Virginia, 2000; 
http://atlas.cs.virginia.edu/~jones/IDS-research/
Documents/jones-sielken-survey-v11.pdf.
12. N. L. Hjort et al., eds. Bayesian Nonparametrics, 
vol. 28, Cambridge Univ., 2010. 
13. J. Dean and S. Ghemawat, “MapReduce: Simpli-
fied Data Processing on Large Clusters,” Comm. 
ACM, vol. 51, no. 1, 2008, pp. 107–113.
14. B. Tian et al., “A Mutual-Healing Key Distribu-
tion Scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks,” J. 
Network and Computer Applications, vol. 34, no. 
1, 2011, pp. 80–88.
15. B. Tian et al., “Self-Healing Key Distribution 
Schemes for Wireless Networks: A Survey,” 
Computer J., vol. 54, no. 4, 2011, pp. 549–569.
Zhiyuan tan is a postdoctoral research fellow in 
the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics, 
and Computer Science, University of Twente, En-
schede, Netherlands. His research interests include net-
work security, pattern recognition, machine learning, 
and distributed systems. Tan received a PhD from the 
University of Technology Sydney (UTS), Australia. He’s 
an IEEE member. Contact him at z.tan@utwente.nl.
uPasana t. nagar is a PhD student in the 
School of Computing and Communications at the 
University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), Australia, 
















and a student member of the Research Centre for In-
novation in IT Services and Applications (iNEXT) at 
UTS. Her research interests include network security, 
pattern recognition, and cloud computing. Nagar re-
ceived a bachelor’s degree in electronics from the Na-
tional Institute of Technology, Surat. Contact her at 
Upasana.T.Nagar@student.uts.edu.au. 
Xiangjian he is a professor of computer science 
in the School of Computing and Communications 
at the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS). He’s 
also director of the Computer Vision and Recognition 
Laboratory, leader of the Network Security Research 
group, and a deputy director of the Research Centre 
for Innovation in IT Services and Applications (iN-
EXT) at UTS. His research interests include network 
security, image processing, pattern recognition, and 
computer vision. He received a PhD in computer sci-
ence from the University of Technology Sydney (UTS), 
Australia. He’s an IEEE senior member. Contact him 
at Xiangjian.He@uts.edu.au.
Priyadarsi nanda is a senior lecturer in the 
School of Computing and Communications at the 
University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), Australia. 
He’s also a core research member at the Centre for 
Innovation in IT Services Applications (iNEXT) at 
UTS. His research interests include network security, 
network QoS, sensor networks, and wireless networks. 
Nanda received a PhD in computer science from the 
University of Technology Sydney (UTS), Australia. He’s 
an IEEE  senior member. Contact him at Priyadarsi 
.Nanda@uts.edu.au.
ren Ping liu  is a principal scientist of network-
ing technology at the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and an ad-
junct professor at Macquarie University and the Uni-
versity of Technology, Sydney (UTS), Australia. His 
research interests include MAC protocol design, Mar-
kov analysis, quality-of-service scheduling, TCP/IP 
internetworking, and network security. Liu received 
a PhD in electrical and computer engineering from 
University of Newcastle, Australia. He’s an IEEE se-
nior member. Contact him at Ren.Liu@csiro.au.
song Wang is a senior lecturer with the Depart-
ment of Electronic Engineering, La Trobe University, 
Melbourne, Australia. Her research interests include 
biometric security, blind system identification, and 
wireless communication. Wang received a PhD in 
electrical and electronic engineering from the Uni-
versity of Melbourne. Contact her at song.wang@
latrobe.edu.au.
jiankun hu is a full professor and research direc-
tor of the Cyber Security Lab, School of Engineering 
and IT, University of New South Wales at the Aus-
tralian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. 
His research interests are in the field of cybersecurity 
including biometrics security. Hu received a PhD in 
control engineering from Harbin Institute of Technol-
ogy, China. He’s an IEEE member. Contact him at 
j.hu@adfa.edu.au.
Selected CS articles and columns are also available 
for free at http://Computingnow.computer.org.
